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Abstract
We construct binary dynamic traitor tracing schemes, where the
number of watermark bits needed to trace and disconnect any
coalition of pirates is quadratic in the number of pirates, and
logarithmic in the total number of users and the error probabil-
ity. Our results improve upon results of Tassa, and our schemes
have several other advantages, such as being able to generate all
codewords in advance, a simple accusation method, and flexi-
bility when the feedback from the pirate network is delayed.
1 Introduction
To protect digital content from unauthorized redistribution, dis-
tributors embed watermarks in the content such that, if a cus-
tomer distributes his copy of the content, the distributor can see
this copy, extract the watermark and see which user it belongs
to. By embedding a unique watermark for each different user,
the distributor can always determine from the detected water-
mark which of the customers is guilty. However, several users
could cooperate to form a coalition, and compare their differ-
ently watermarked copies to look for the watermark. Assuming
that the original data is the same for all users, the differences
they detect are differences in their watermarks. The colluders
can then distort this watermark, and distribute a copy which
matches all their copies on the positions where they detected
no differences, and has some possibly non-deterministic output
on the detected watermark positions. Since the watermark does
not match any user’s watermark exactly, finding the guilty users
is non-trivial.
In this paper we focus on the problem of constructing effi-
cient collusion-resistant schemes for tracing pirates, which in-
volves finding a way to choose watermark symbols for each
user (the traitor tracing code) and a way to trace a detected copy
back to the guilty users (an accusation algorithm). In particular,
we will focus on the application of such schemes in the dynamic
setting, where the pirate output is detected in real-time, before
the next watermark symbols are embedded in consecutive seg-
ments of the content. We will show that by building upon the
(static) Tardos scheme [10], we can construct efficient and flexi-
ble dynamic traitor tracing schemes. The number of watermark
symbols needed in our schemes is a significant improvement
compared to the scheme of Tassa [11], and our schemes can
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be easily adjusted when the model is slightly different from the
standard dynamic traitor tracing model [1, 4, 8, 11].
1.1 Model
Let us first formally describe the mathematical model for the
problem discussed in this paper. First, some entity called the
distributor controls the database of watermarks and distributes
the content. The recipients, each receiving a watermarked copy
of the content, are referred to as users. We write U = {1, . . . ,n}
for the set of all users, and we commonly use the symbol j
for indexing these users. For the watermarks, we refer to the
sequence of watermarking symbols assigned to a user j by the
vector ~X j, which is also called a codeword. We write ℓ for the
total number of watermark symbols in a codeword, so that each
codeword ~X j has length ℓ, and we commonly use the symbol i to
index the watermark positions. We write X for the algorithm
used to generate the codewords ~X j. In this paper we only focus
on watermark symbols from a binary alphabet, so that (~X j)i ∈
{0,1} for all i, j. A common way to represent the traitor tracing
code is by putting all codewords ~X j as rows in a matrix X , so
that X j,i = (~X j)i is the symbol on position i of user j.
After assigning a codeword to each user, the codewords are
embedded in the data as watermarks. The watermarked copies
are sent to the users, and some of the users (called the pirates
or colluders) collude to create a pirate copy. The pirates form
a subset C ⊆U , and we use c = |C| for the number of pirates
in the coalition. The pirate copy has some distorted watermark,
denoted by ~y. We assume that if on some position i all pirates
see the same symbol, they output this symbol. This assumption
is known in the literature as the marking assumption. On other
positions we assume pirates simply choose one of the two sym-
bols to output. This choice of pirate symbols can be formalized
by denoting a pirate strategy by a (probabilistic) function ρ ,
which maps a code matrix X (or the part of the matrix visible to
them) to a forgery~y. After the coalition generates a pirate copy,
we assume the distributor detects it and uses some accusation
algorithm σ to map the forgery~y to some subset σ(~y) = ˆC ⊆U
of accused users. These users are then disconnected from the
system. Ideally ˆC =C, but this may not always be achievable.
Static schemes. We distinguish between two types of
schemes. In static schemes, the process ends after one run of
the above algorithm with a fixed codelength ℓ, and the set ˆC is
the final set of accused users. So the complete codewords are
generated and distributed, the pirates generate and distribute a
pirate copy, and the distributor detects this output and calculates
the set of accused users. In this case an elementary result is that
one can never have any certainty of catching all pirates. After
all, the coalition could decide to sacrifice one of its members, so
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that~y = ~X j for some j ∈C. Then it is impossible to distinguish
between other pirates j′ ∈C\{ j} and innocent users j′ ∈U \C.
However, static schemes do exist that achieve catching at least
one guilty user and not accusing any innocent users with high
probability. The original Tardos scheme [10] belongs to this
class of schemes.
Dynamic schemes. The other type of scheme is the class of
dynamic schemes, where the process of sending out symbols,
detecting pirate output and running an accusation algorithm is
repeated multiple times. In this case, if a user is caught, he is
immediately cut off from the system and can no longer access
the content. These dynamic scenarios for example apply to live
broadcasts, such as pay-tv. The distributor broadcasts the con-
tent, while the pirates directly output a pirate copy of the con-
tent. The distributor then listens in on this pirate broadcast, ex-
tracts the watermarks, and uses this information for the choice
of watermarks for the next segment of the content. We assume
that the pirates always try to keep their broadcast running, so
that if one of the pirates is disconnected, the other pirates will
take over. Ideally one demands that the set of accused users al-
ways matches the exact coalition, i.e. ˆC =C, and with dynamic
schemes we can also achieve this with high probability, as we
will see later. The new schemes we present in this paper belong
to this class of schemes.
As mentioned earlier, we call static schemes successful if
with high probability, at least one guilty user is caught, and
no innocent users are accused. With dynamic schemes one can
catch all pirates, so we only call such schemes successful if with
high probability, all pirates are caught and no innocent users are
accused. This leads to the following definitions of soundness
and static/dynamic completeness.
Definition 1 (Soundness and completeness). Let (X ,σ) be a
traitor tracing scheme, let c0 ≥ 2 and let ε1,ε2 ∈ (0,1). Then
this scheme is called ε1-sound, if for all coalitions C ⊆U and
pirate strategies ρ , the probability of accusing one or more in-
nocent users is bounded from above by
P( ˆC 6⊆C)≤ ε1.
A static traitor tracing scheme (X ,σ) is called static (ε2,c0)-
complete, if for all coalitions C⊆U of size at most c0 and for all
pirate strategies ρ , the probability of not catching any pirates
is bounded from above by
P(C∩ ˆC = /0)≤ ε2.
Finally, a dynamic traitor tracing scheme (X ,σ) is called dy-
namic (ε2,c0)-complete, if for all coalitions C ⊆ U of size at
most c0 and for all pirate strategies ρ , the probability of not
catching all pirates is bounded from above by
P(C 6⊆ ˆC)≤ ε2.
Note that we distinguish between c, the actual collusion size,
and c0, the estimated collusion size used by the distributor to
build the traitor tracing scheme. Since c is usually unknown,
the distributor has to make a guess c0 ≈ c, which has to be suf-
ficiently large to guarantee security, and sufficiently small to
guarantee efficiency.
In the following sections we will omit the c0 in the com-
pleteness property if the parameter is implicit. Similarly, when
ε1 or ε2 is implicit, we simply call a scheme sound or com-
plete. As we will see later, in the schemes discussed in this
paper, ε1/n and ε2 are closely related. We will use the nota-
tion η = ln(ε2)/ ln(ε1/n) to denote the log ratio of these error
probabilities. In most practical scenarios we have ε1/n < ε2, so
usually η ∈ (0,1).
1.2 Related work
The schemes in this paper all build upon the Tardos scheme
[10], introduced in 2003. This is an efficient static traitor tracing
scheme, and it was the first scheme to achieve ε1-soundness and
(ε2,c0)-completeness with a codelength of ℓ = O(c20 ln(n/ε1)).
In the same paper it was proved that this order codelength is
asymptotically optimal for large c. The original Tardos scheme
had a codelength of ℓ = 100c20 ln(n/ε1), and several improve-
ments of the Tardos scheme have been suggested to reduce the
constant before the c20 ln(n/ε1). We mention two in particular:
the improved analysis done by Blayer and Tassa [2]; and the
introduction of a symmetric score function by ˇSkoric´ et al. [9].
Laarhoven and De Weger combined these improvements [6] to
get even shorter codelength constants. For c0 ≥ 2 and η ≤ 1,
this construction gives codelengths of ℓ < 24c20 ln(n/ε1), with
the constant further decreasing as c0 increases or η decreases.
For asymptotically large c0, this construction leads to code-
lengths satisfying ℓ= [pi22 +O(c
−1/3
0 )]c
2
0 ln(n/ε1). The symmet-
ric Tardos scheme and its properties are discussed in Section 2.
For the dynamic setting, we mention four papers. In 2001,
Fiat and Tassa [4] constructed a deterministic scheme, i.e., a
scheme with ε1 = ε2 = 0. The number of symbols needed
to catch pirates in that scheme is only ℓ = O(c logn), but
the alphabet size required is q = 2c + 1. In the same year,
Berkman et al. [1] proposed several deterministic schemes us-
ing a smaller alphabet of size q = c + 1, with codelengths
ranging from O(c3 log2(n)) to O(c2 + c log2(n)). In 2005,
Tassa [11] combined the dynamic scheme of Fiat and Tassa [4]
with the static scheme of Boneh and Shaw [3], to get a dy-
namic scheme using a binary alphabet, with a codelength of
ℓ = O(c4 log2(n) ln(c/ε1)). In the same paper it was sug-
gested that using the Tardos scheme instead of the scheme of
Boneh and Shaw as a building block may decrease the code-
length by a factor c, thus possibly giving a codelength of ℓ =
O(c3 log2(n) ln(c/ε1)). In 2011, Roelse [8] presented another
deterministic scheme. As in the generalization of the scheme of
Fiat and Tassa presented by Berkman et al. [1], in the scheme of
Roelse the alphabet size equals kc+1 with k≥ 2 and for a fixed
value of k, the codelength is O(c logn). Moreover, the real-time
computational cost and the bandwidth usage are logarithmic in
n, instead of linear in n as in the scheme of Fiat and Tassa and
its generalization of Berkman et al. [1].
1.3 Contributions and outline
First we show that the static Tardos scheme can be extended to
a dynamic traitor tracing scheme in an efficient way, allowing
us to catch the whole coalition instead of at least one colluder.
This dynamic scheme has a codelength of ℓ= O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)),
where the constants only slightly increase compared to the con-
stants of Laarhoven and De Weger [6]. The adjustments do not
influence the method of generating codewords, so these can still
be generated in advance.
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To avoid the loss of efficiency caused by having to choose a
value c0, we then show how to create a c0-independent “univer-
sal” dynamic scheme that does not require a sharp estimate of
c as input. The property that the codewords can be generated
in advance is left unchanged, while the scheme also has several
advantages with respect to flexibility, detailed in Section 6. The
codelength of this scheme is also ℓ = O(c2 ln(n/ε1)), thus im-
proving upon the results of Tassa [11] by roughly a factor O(c2)
and upon the suggested improvement of Tassa by a factor O(c).
The paper is organized as follows. First, we recall the con-
struction of the static symmetric Tardos scheme and its prop-
erties in Section 2. This scheme and its results will be used
as the foundation for the dynamic Tardos scheme, which we
present in Section 3. Then, in Section 4 we present a modifica-
tion of the dynamic Tardos scheme when the setting is not fully
dynamic. In Section 5 we then present the universal Tardos
scheme, which is an extension of the dynamic Tardos scheme
that does not require a sharp bound on c as input. In Section 6,
we discuss the results and argue that our schemes have several
advantages with respect to flexibility as well. Finally, in Sec-
tion 7 we list some open problems raised by our work.
This paper is mainly based on results from the first author’s
Master’s thesis [5].
2 Preliminaries: The Tardos scheme
The results in the next sections all build upon results from
the (static) symmetric Tardos scheme, so we first discuss this
scheme here. Since the codeword generation of the schemes
discussed in this paper all use (a variant of) the arcsine distribu-
tion, we also explicitly mention this distribution below.
2.1 Arcsine distribution
The standard arcsine distribution function F(p) on [0,1], and its
associated probability density function f (p), are given by:
F(p) =
2
pi
arcsin(√p), f (p) = 1
pi
√
p(1− p) . (1)
This distribution function will be used in Section 5. In Sec-
tions 2, 3 and 4 we will use a variant of this distribution func-
tion, where the values of p cannot be arbitrarily close to 0 and
1, as this generally leads to a high probability of accusing inno-
cent users. Tardos [10] therefore used the arcsine distribution
with a certain small cutoff parameter δ > 0, such that p is al-
ways between δ and 1− δ . By scaling F and f appropriately
on this interval, this leads to the following distribution functions
Fδ and associated probability density functions fδ :
Fδ (p) =
2arcsin(√p)− 2arcsin(
√
δ )
pi− 4arcsin(
√
δ )
, (2)
fδ (p) = 1
(pi− 4arcsin(
√
δ ))
√
p(1− p) . (3)
Note that taking δ = 0 (i.e., using no cutoff) leads to F0(p) ≡
F(p).
2.2 Construction
The Tardos scheme, with parameters dℓ,dz,dδ as used by Blayer
and Tassa [2] and Laarhoven and De Weger [6], and with the
symmetric score function introduced by ˇSkoric´ et al. [9], is de-
scribed below.
1. Initialization phase
(a) Take the codelength as ℓ= dℓc20 ln(n/ε1).
(b) Take the threshold as Z = dzc0 ln(n/ε1).
(c) Take the cutoff parameter as δ = 1/(dδ c4/30 ). 1
2. Codeword generation
For each position 1≤ i≤ ℓ:
(a) Select pi ∈ [δ ,1− δ ] from the distribution function
Fδ (p) defined in (2).
(b) For each user j ∈ U , generate the ith entry of the
codeword of user j according to P(X j,i = 1) = pi and
P(X j,i = 0) = 1− pi.
3. Distribution of codewords
Send to each user j ∈ U their codeword ~X j =
(X j,1, . . . ,X j,ℓ), embedded as a watermark in the content.
4. Detection of pirate output
Detect the pirate output, and extract the watermark ~y =
(y1, . . . ,yℓ).
5. Accusation phase
For each user j ∈U :
(a) For each position 1≤ i≤ ℓ, calculate the user’s score
S j,i for this position according to:
S j,i =


+
√
(1− pi)/pi if X j,i = 1,yi = 1,
−
√
(1− pi)/pi if X j,i = 1,yi = 0,
−
√
pi/(1− pi) if X j,i = 0,yi = 1,
+
√
pi/(1− pi) if X j,i = 0,yi = 0.
(4)
(b) Calculate the user’s total score S j(ℓ) = ∑ℓi=1 S j,i.
(c) User j is accused (i.e. j ∈ ˆC) iff S j(ℓ)> Z.
2.3 Soundness
For the above construction, one can prove soundness and static
completeness, provided the constants dℓ,dz,dδ satisfy certain
requirements. For soundness, Laarhoven and De Weger [6]
proved the following lemma. Here h(x) = (ex − 1− x)/x2,
which is a strictly increasing function from (0,∞) to ( 12 ,∞).
Lemma 1. [6, Lemma 1] Let the Tardos scheme be constructed
as in Section 2.2. Let j be some arbitrary innocent user, and let
a > 0. Then
E
(
eaS j(ℓ)c
−1
0
)
≤
(ε1
n
)−aλadℓ
,
where λa = ah(a
√
dδ c
−1/3
0 ).
1Previously [2, 6, 9, 10], it was common to parametrize the offset δ as δ =
1/(dδ c0). However, Laarhoven and De Weger [6] showed that to get an optimal
codelength, δ should scale as c−4/30 rather than c−10 . Therefore we now use
δ = 1/(dδ c4/30 ), with dδ converging to a non-zero constant for asymptotically
large c0 .
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Now if the following condition of soundness is satisfied,
∃ a > 0 : a(dz−λadℓ)≥ 1, (S)
then using the Markov inequality and Lemma 1 with this a, for
innocent users j we get
P( j ∈ ˆC)≤ P(S j(ℓ)> Z) = P(eaS j(ℓ)c
−1
0 > eaZc
−1
0 )
≤
E
(
eaS j(ℓ)c
−1
0
)
eaZc
−1
0
≤
(ε1
n
)a(dz−λadℓ) ≤ ε1
n
.
So the probability that no innocent user is accused is at least
(1− ε1
n
)n ≥ 1− ε1, as was also shown by Laarhoven and De
Weger [6, Theorem 3].
2.4 Static completeness
To prove static completeness, Laarhoven and De Weger [6] used
the following lemma. Below, and throughout the rest of this pa-
per, S(ℓ) = ∑ j∈C S j(ℓ) represents the total coalition score, i.e.,
the sum of the scores of all pirates j ∈C.
Lemma 2. [6, Lemma 2] Let the Tardos scheme be constructed
as in Section 2.2, and let b > 0. Then
E
(
e−bS(ℓ)c
−5/3
0
)
≤
(ε1
n
)bλbdℓc1/30
,
where λb = 2pi − 4dδ pi c
−1/3
0 − bh(b
√
dδ )c
−2/3
0 .
If the following condition of completeness is satisfied,
∃ b > 0 : b(λbdℓ− dz)≥ ηc−1/30 , (C)
then using the pigeonhole principle, the Markov inequality and
Lemma 2 with this b we get
P(C∩ ˆC = /0)≤ P(S(ℓ)< c0Z)≤
E
(
e−bS(ℓ)c
−5/3
0
)
e−bZc
−2/3
0
≤
(ε1
n
)b(λbdℓ−dz)c1/30 ≤ (ε1
n
)η
= ε2.
So static completeness follows from Lemma 2 and condi-
tion (C), as was also shown by Laarhoven and De Weger [6,
Theorem 4].
2.5 Codelengths
Blayer and Tassa [2], and subsequently Laarhoven and De
Weger [6], gave a detailed analysis to go from requirements
(S) and (C) to the optimal set of parameters that satisfies the
constraints and minimizes dℓ. Recall that ℓ = dℓc20 ln(n/ε1), so
a smaller dℓ gives shorter codelengths, whereas the parameters
dz and dδ affect only Z and δ , which have no influence on the
efficiency of the scheme. In the end, the following result was
obtained.
Lemma 3. [6, Theorem 6] Let γ =
( 2
3pi
)2/3 ≈ 0.36. The asymp-
totically optimal value for dℓ is
dℓ =
pi2
2
+O(c−1/30 ),
the associated values for dz and dδ are
dz = pi +O(c−1/30 ), dδ =
4
γ −O
(
η
lnc0
)
,
and the corresponding values for a,b,λa,λb are
a =
2
pi
−O(c−1/30 ), b =
lnc0
9piγ −O
(
ln
(
lnc0
η
))
,
λa =
1
pi
+O(c−1/30 ), λb =
2
pi
−O(c−1/30 ).
A direct consequence of Lemma 3 is the following, which
gives the asymptotically optimal scheme parameters for c0 →
∞.
Corollary 1. [6, Corollary 1] The construction from Section
2.2 gives an ε1-sound and static (ε2,c0)-complete scheme with
asymptotic scheme parameters
ℓ→ pi
2
2
c20 ln(n/ε1), Z → pic0 ln(n/ε1), δ →
γ
4
c
−4/3
0 .
For further details on the optimal first order constants, see
Laarhoven and De Weger [6].
2.6 Example
For the next few sections, we will use a running example
to compare the codelengths of the several schemes. Let the
scheme parameters be given by c0 = 25 pirates, n = 106 users,
and error probabilities ε1 = ε2 = 10−3. Then η = 13 , and the
optimal values of dℓ,dz,dδ can be calculated numerically as
dℓ = 8.46, dz = 4.53, dδ = 14.36.
This leads to the scheme parameters
ℓ= 109585, Z = 2345, δ = 5.09 ·10−4.
So using these scheme parameters, we know that after 109585
symbols, with probability at least 0.999 there are no false ac-
cusations (regardless of the actual coalition size c), and with
probability at least 0.999 at least one pirate is accused if the ac-
tual coalition size c does not exceed the bound on the coalition
size c0 = 25. In Fig. 1 we show simulation results for these
parameters, with c = c0 = 25. The curves in the figure are the
pirate scores S j(i) for each pirate j ∈C, while the shaded area
is bounded from above by the highest score of an innocent user,
and bounded from below by the lowest score of an innocent
user in this simulation. In Fig. 1a we simulated pirates using
the interleaving attack (i.e. for each position, they choose a ran-
dom pirate and output his symbol), and in Fig. 1b they used the
scapegoat strategy (i.e. one pirate, the scapegoat, always out-
puts his symbol, until he is caught and another pirate is picked
as the scapegoat). With the scapegoat strategy, only one pirate
is caught, while using the interleaving attack leads to many ac-
cused pirates.
3 The dynamic Tardos scheme
Let us now explain how we create a dynamic scheme from the
static Tardos scheme, such that with high probability we catch
4
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(b) Scapegoat strategy
Figure 1: Simulations of the Tardos scheme, with c= c0 = 25 colluders, n= 106
users, and error probabilities ε1 = ε2 = 10−3. The green, shaded area corre-
sponds to the range of innocent user scores, the red lines correspond to pirate
scores, and the dashed lines correspond to the threshold Z and codelength ℓ. In
Fig. 1a the pirates used the interleaving attack, whereas in Fig. 1b they used
the scapegoat strategy. In both cases, the total coalition score S(ℓ) at time ℓ
is approximately 72000, but while in the first case the score is evenly divided
among the pirates, in the second case one pirate takes all the blame.
all colluders, instead of at least one colluder. The change we
make is the following. Instead of only comparing the cumula-
tive user scores to Z after ℓ symbols, we now compare the scores
to Z after every single position i. If a user’s score exceeds Z at
any point in time, he is disconnected immediately and can no
longer access the content. His score is then necessarily between
Z and ˜Z := Z +
√
dδ c
2/3
0 > Z +maxpi,X j,i ,yi S j,i. The other parts
of the construction remain the same, except for the values of
dℓ,dz,dδ , which now have to be chosen differently.
3.1 Construction
The scheme again depends on three constants dℓ,dz,dδ . We
will show in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 that if certain requirements
on these constants are satisfied, we can prove soundness and dy-
namic completeness. Below we say a user is active if he has not
yet been disconnected from the scheme. As mentioned before,
we assume that the pirates always output some watermarked
data, unless all of the pirates are disconnected. In that case, the
traitor tracing scheme terminates.
1. Initialization phase
(a) Take the codelength as ℓ= dℓc20 ln(n/ε1).
(b) Take the threshold as Z = dzc0 ln(n/ε1).
(c) Take the cutoff parameter as δ = 1/(dδ c4/30 ).
(d) Set initial user scores at S j(0) = 0.
2. Codeword generation
For each position 1≤ i≤ ℓ:
(a) Select pi ∈ [δ ,1− δ ] from Fδ (p) defined in (2).
(b) Generate X j,i ∈ {0,1} using P(X j,i = 1) = pi.
3. Distribution/Detection/Accusation
For each position 1≤ i≤ ℓ:
(a) Send to each active user j symbol X j,i.
(b) Detect the pirate output yi.
(If there is no pirate output, terminate.)
(c) Calculate scores S j,i using (4).
(d) For active users j, set S j(i) = S j(i− 1)+ S j,i.
(For inactive users j, set S j(i) = S j(i− 1).)
(e) Disconnect all active users j with S j(i)> Z.
In the construction above, we separated the codeword gen-
eration from the distribution, detection and accusation. These
phases can also be merged by generating pi and X j,i once we
need them. However, we present the scheme as above to empha-
size the fact that these phases can indeed be executed sequen-
tially instead of simultaneously, and that the codeword genera-
tion can thus be done before the traitor tracing process begins.
3.2 Soundness
For the dynamic Tardos scheme as given above, we can prove
the following result regarding soundness.
Theorem 1. Consider the dynamic Tardos scheme in Sec-
tion 3.1. If the following condition is satisfied,
∃ a > 0 : a(dz−λadℓ)≥ 1+
ln(2)
ln(n/ε1)
, (S’)
then the scheme is ε1-sound.
To prove the theorem, we first prove a relative upper bound
on the probability that a single innocent user is accused and
disconnected. This bound relates the error probability in the
dynamic Tardos scheme to the probability that the user score
at time ℓ is above Z. We then use the proof of the original
Tardos scheme to get an absolute upper bound on the soundness
error probability, and to prove Theorem 1. Since the relative
upper bound gives us an extra factor 2, and since the terms in
(S’) appear as exponents in the proof, we get an additional term
ln(2)/ ln(n/ε1) compared to (S). Note that this term is small for
reasonable values of n and ε1, so this only has a small impact
on the right hand side of (S’), compared to (S).
In the following we write ˜S j(i) = ∑ik=1 S jk for the extended
user score. If user j is still active at time i, then ˜S j(i) = S j(i).
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But whereas S j(i) does not change anymore once user j is dis-
connected, the score ˜S j(i) does change on every position, even
if the user has already been disconnected. The score ˜S j then
calculates the user’s score as if he had not been disconnected.
Similarly, we write ˜S(i) = ∑ j∈C ˜S j(i) for coalitions C. Note that
if the last pirate is disconnected at position i0 < ℓ, then S j,i and
S j(i) are not defined for i0 < i≤ ℓ.
Lemma 4. Let j ∈ U be an arbitrary innocent user, let C ⊆
U \ { j} be a pirate coalition and let ρ be some pirate strategy
employed by this coalition. Then
P( j ∈ ˆC) = P(S j(ℓ)> Z)≤ 2 ·P
(
˜S j(ℓ)> Z
)
.
Proof. Let us define events A and B as
A := { j ∈ ˆC}= {S j(ℓ)> Z}=
ℓ⋃
i=1
{ ˜S j(i)> Z},
B := { ˜S j(ℓ)> Z}.
We trivially have P(A | B) = 1. For P(B | A), note that under the
assumption that A holds, the process { ˜S j(i)}∞i=i0 starting at posi-
tion i0 = min{i : S j(i) > Z} ≤ ℓ describes a symmetric random
walk with no drift. So we then have P( ˜S j(ℓ) ≥ ˜S j(i0)) = 1/2,
and since S j(i0) > Z it follows that P(B | A)≥ 1/2. Finally we
apply Bayes’ Theorem to A and B to get
P(A) =
P(A | B)
P(B | A) ·P(B)≤ 2 ·P(B).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we remark that the distribution of
˜S j(ℓ) is the same as the distribution of the scores S j(ℓ) in the
original Tardos scheme, for the same parameters ℓ,Z,δ . From
the Markov inequality, Lemma 1 and condition (S’) it thus fol-
lows that
P( ˜S j (ℓ)> Z)≤
E
(
ea
˜S j(ℓ)c−10
)
eaZc
−1
0
≤
(ε1
n
)a(dz−λadℓ) ≤ ε1
2n
.
Using Lemma 4 the result follows.
3.3 Dynamic completeness
With the dynamic Tardos scheme, we get the following result
regarding dynamic completeness. Recall that here we require
that all pirates are caught, instead of at least one, as was the
case in the original Tardos scheme.
Theorem 2. Consider the dynamic Tardos scheme in Sec-
tion 3.1. If the following condition is satisfied,
∃ b > 0 : b(λbdℓ− dz)≥
(
η + ln(2)+ b
√
dδ
ln(n/ε1)
)
c
−1/3
0 , (C’)
then the scheme is dynamic (ε2,c0)-complete.
Similar to the proof of soundness, we prove dynamic com-
pleteness by relating the error probability to the static complete-
ness error probability of the static Tardos scheme described in
Section 2. Then we use the results from the static scheme to
complete the proof. We again see a factor 2 in the relative upper
bound in Lemma 5, which again comes from a random walk ar-
gument, and which explains the additional term ln(2)/ ln(n/ε1)
in (C’). The other term b√dδ/ ln(n/ε1) is a consequence of us-
ing ˜Z instead of Z in the proofs. Note that these two terms are
generally small, compared to the term η .
Lemma 5. Let C be a coalition of size at most c0, and let ρ be
any pirate strategy employed by this coalition. Then
P
(
C 6⊆ ˆC)≤ 2 ·P( ˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z) .
Proof. First we remark that P( ˜S(ℓ) < c0 ˜Z | C 6⊆ ˆC) ≥ 1/2. In
other words, if not all pirates are caught by the end, the total
extended coalition score will be below c0 ˜Z with probability at
least 1/2. This is because if C 6⊆ ˆC, then S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z, and since
˜S(ℓ)−S(ℓ) = R(ℓ) is a symmetric, unbiased random walk, with
probability at least 1/2 we have R(ℓ)< 0 and as a consequence
˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z. Next, we use the definition of conditional probabil-
ities to get
P(C 6⊆ ˆC)≤ 2 ·P(C 6⊆ ˆC) ·P( ˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z |C 6⊆ ˆC)
= 2 ·P( ˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z,C 6⊆ ˆC)≤ 2 ·P( ˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z).
This proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, note that in the dynamic Tardos
scheme, the only extra information pirates receive compared
to the static Tardos scheme is the fact whether some of them
are disconnected. This information is certainly covered by the
information contained in the previous values of pi; if pirates
receive p1, . . . , pi−1, then they can calculate their current scores
themselves and calculate whether they would have been discon-
nected or not. Also note that ˜S(ℓ) behaves the same as S(ℓ) in
the static Tardos scheme, where the total coalition score is cal-
culated for all pirates and all positions, regardless of whether
they contributed on that position or not. So if we can prove
that even in the static Tardos scheme, and even if coalitions
get information about the previous values of pi (for which yi
was already determined), the probability of keeping the coali-
tion score S(ℓ) below c0 ˜Z is bounded by ε2/2, then it follows
that also P( ˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z)≤ ε2/2.
For the static Tardos scheme, note that the proof method for
the completeness property does not rely on the other values of
pi being secret. In fact, pi and pi′ are independent for i 6= i′. The
only assumption that is used in that proof is that the Marking
Assumption applies, which does apply here, and that the current
value pi is hidden before yi is generated. So here we can also
use the proof method of the static Tardos scheme. From the
Markov inequality, Lemma 2 and condition (C’), it thus follows
that
P
(
˜S(ℓ)< c0 ˜Z
)≤ E
(
e−b ˜S(ℓ)c
−5/3
0
)
e−b(Z+
√
dδ c
2/3
0 )c
−2/3
0
≤
(ε1
n
)b(λbdℓ−dz− √dδln(n/ε1) c−1/30
)
c
1/3
0
≤
(ε1
n
)η+ ln2ln(n/ε1) = ε2
2
.
Using Lemma 5 the result then follows.
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Figure 2: Optimal values of dℓ in the dynamic Tardos scheme. The dotted line
corresponds to the asymptotic optimal value dℓ = pi
2
2 ≈ 4.93. The bold curves
show the values of dℓ in the static Tardos scheme for η = 1 (top) and η = 0.01
(bottom) respectively. The five curves slightly above each of the bold curves
show the optimal values of dℓ in the dynamic Tardos scheme for n/ε1 = 103k,
for k = 1 up to 5. Higher values of k correspond to lower values of dℓ.
3.4 Codelengths
The requirements (S’) and (C’) are only slightly different from
requirements (S) and (C). For asymptotically large c0, these dif-
ferences even disappear, and the optimal asymptotic codelength
is the same as in the static Tardos scheme. In Fig. 2 we show the
optimal values of dℓ in the dynamic Tardos scheme for η = 1
and η = 0.01. The different curves correspond to different val-
ues of n/ε1, ranging from n/ε1 = 103 (the highest values of dℓ)
to n/ε1 = 1015 (the lowest values of dℓ).
Note that these values of dℓ correspond to the theoretical
codelengths such that with probability at least 1− ε1, by time ℓ
all of the pirates have been disconnected. This does not mean
that the last pirate is likely to be caught exactly at time ℓ; this
means that he is likely to be caught before or at time ℓ. So in
practice the number of symbols needed to disconnect all traitors
may very well be below this theoretical codelength ℓ, and may
even decrease compared to the static Tardos scheme.
Furthermore, if the coalition size is not known, then one gen-
erally uses a traitor tracing scheme that is resistant against up
to c0 > c colluders. ˇSkoric´ et al. [9] showed that in the Tar-
dos scheme, the total coalition score S(i) = ∑ j∈C S j(i) always
increases linearly in i with approximately the same slope, re-
gardless of the actual coalition size c or the employed pirate
strategy ρ . More precisely, the score S(i) behaves as S(i)≈ iµ˜ ,
with µ˜ ≈ 2pi only slightly depending on the coalition size c and
the pirate strategy ρ . Since one chooses ℓ and Z such that
S(ℓ) ≈ ℓµ˜ ≈ c0Z, it follows that S( cc0 ℓ) ≈ cZ. In other words,
to catch a coalition of size c≤ c0, the expected number of sym-
bols needed is approximately ℓ=O( c
c0
ℓ) =O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)). So
compared to the static Tardos scheme, where the codelength is
fixed in advance at O(c20 ln(n/ε1)), the codelength is reduced
by a factor c
c0
. In particular, small coalitions of few pirates are
generally caught up to O(c0) times faster, for c0 ≫ c.
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(b) Scapegoat strategy
Figure 3: Simulations of the dynamic Tardos scheme, with the same parameters
c, c0, n, ε1 and ε2 as in Fig. 1. Users are now disconnected as soon as their
scores exceed the threshold Z, i.e., as soon as their corresponding score curves
cross the bold horizontal line. In both cases, after less than 95000 symbols
all pirates have been caught, which is less than the theoretical codelength ℓ =
116561, and less than the codelength of the static Tardos scheme with the same
parameters, ℓ= 109585.
3.5 Example
Let the scheme parameters be the same as in Section 2.6, i.e.,
c0 = 25, n= 106 and ε1 = ε2 = 10−3, so that η = 13 . The optimal
values of dℓ,dz,dδ satisfying (S’) and (C’) can be calculated
numerically as
dℓ = 9.00, dz = 4.73, dδ = 13.44
This leads to the scheme parameters
ℓ= 116561, Z = 2448, δ = 1.02 ·10−3
In Fig. 3 we show some simulation results for these parame-
ters, with the actual coalition also consisting of c = c0 = 25
colluders. In Fig. 3a the pirates used the interleaving attack,
and in Fig. 3b they used the scapegoat strategy. In both cases,
the whole coalition is caught well before we reach ℓ symbols.
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4 The weakly dynamic Tardos scheme
In the dynamic Tardos scheme, we need to disconnect users as
soon as their scores exceed the threshold Z. In some scenarios
this may not be possible. For example, the pirates may transmit
each symbol with a delay.
We call a traitor tracing scheme weakly dynamic if B (B≥ 1)
symbols are distributed during the delay between the original
broadcast and the corresponding pirate output. Observe that the
dynamic schemes presented in [1, 4, 8, 11] are not weakly dy-
namic schemes, as these schemes use the value of each symbol
to adapt the distribution of the next symbols (i.e. B= 0 for these
schemes).
In this section we present two weakly dynamic schemes
based on the dynamic Tardos scheme. First, in Section 4.1
we present a scheme that achieves a codelength of at most
ℓ= dℓc20 ln(n/ε1)+Bc0, where dℓ is the same as in the dynamic
Tardos scheme for the same parameters. For small values of
B, this means that with codelength which is only slightly higher
than in the dynamic Tardos scheme, we can also catch all pirates
in a weakly dynamic setting. Then, in Section 4.2 we present a
scheme that achieves a codelength of ℓ= dℓ,Bc20 ln(n/ε1), where
dℓ,B increases with B. Since a small increase in dℓ can already
lead to a big increase in the codelength, the second scheme gen-
erally has a larger codelength than the first scheme.
4.1 First scheme: ℓ= dℓc20 ln(n/ε1)+Bc0
The first scheme is based on the following modification to the
accusation algorithm of the dynamic Tardos scheme. Suppose
a user’s score exceeds Z after i0 positions. At position i0 we
now disconnect this user. Since this user may have contributed
to the next B symbols of the pirate output ~y, we disregard the
following B ‘contaminated’ positions of the watermark, and do
not update the scores for positions i ∈ {i0+1, . . . , i0 +B}. After
those positions we continue the traitor tracing process as in the
dynamic Tardos scheme, and we repeat the above procedure
each time a user’s score exceeds Z.
With this modification, the traitor tracing process on those
positions that were used for calculating scores is identical to the
traitor tracing process of the dynamic Tardos scheme. We can
therefore use the analysis from Section 3 and conclude that with
at most dℓc20 ln(n/ε1) positions for which we calculate scores,
we can catch any coalition of size c≤ c0. Since we disregarded
at most Bc0 positions, the pirate broadcast will not last longer
than ℓ= dℓc20 ln(n/ε1)+Bc0 positions in total, where dℓ, dz and
dδ are as in the dynamic Tardos scheme for the same parame-
ters. This means that with at most Bc0 more symbols than in
the dynamic Tardos scheme, we can also catch coalitions in this
weakly dynamic traitor tracing setting.
4.2 Second scheme: ℓ= dℓ,Bc20 ln(n/ε1)
Instead of using Bc0 more symbols, we can also try to adjust the
analysis of the dynamic Tardos scheme to the weakly dynamic
traitor tracing scenario. We can do this by following the proof
methods of the dynamic Tardos scheme, and by making one
small adjustment. The change we make in the analysis is to
use ˜ZB := Z +B
√
dδ c
2/3
0 > Z +Bmaxp S j,i(p) instead of ˜Z =
Z +
√
dδ c
2/3
0 as our new upper bound for the scores of users
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Figure 4: Optimal values of dℓ,B in the weakly dynamic Tardos scheme from
Section 4.2, for the parameters n = 106 , ε1 = ε2 = 10−3, and η = 13 . The bold
curve corresponds to the values of dℓ in the static Tardos scheme with the same
parameters, while the six curves above this curve correspond to the optimal
values of dℓ,B for B = 1,2,4,8,16,32 respectively. The dotted line corresponds
to the asymptotic optimal value dℓ = pi
2
2 ≈ 4.93. For B = 1 we get exactly the
codelengths of the dynamic Tardos scheme.
in the proofs. This results in the following, slightly different
condition for dynamic completeness:
∃ b > 0 : b(λbdℓ− dz)≥
(
η + ln(2)+Bb
√
dδ
ln(n/ε1)
)
c
−1/3
0 . (C”)
If some parameters dℓ,B, dz,B, dδ ,B satisfy (S’) and (C”), then
using these constants as our scheme parameters, we obtain a ε1-
sound and dynamic (ε2,c0)-complete scheme with a codelength
of ℓ = dℓ,Bc20 ln(n/ε1). In Fig. 4 we show the values of dℓ,B for
the parameters n = 106, ε1 = ε2 = 10−3, and η = 13 , for several
values of B. As the value of B increases, the values of dℓ,B
increase as well.
4.3 Example
As before, let the scheme parameters be given by c0 = 25, n =
106 and ε1 = ε2 = 10−3, so that η = 13 , and let us use B =
8. With the first proposed scheme, the codelength increases by
Bc0 = 200 symbols compared to the dynamic Tardos scheme,
giving scheme parameters:
ℓ= 116761, Z = 2448, δ = 1.02 ·10−3.
Using the second scheme, the optimal values of dℓ,B,dz,B,dδ ,B
satisfying (S’) and (C”) for B = 8 can be calculated numerically
as
dℓ,B = 10.16, dz,B = 4.94, dδ ,B = 10.07.
This leads to the scheme parameters
ℓ= 131587, Z = 2561, δ = 1.36 ·10−3.
So in this case, using the first scheme leads to the shortest code.
5 The universal Tardos scheme
In this section we present a dynamic scheme that does not re-
quire a sharp upper bound c0 on c as input to guarantee quick
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detection of pirates. This means that even if we set c0 = n,
coalitions of any size are caught quickly. We use the word “uni-
versal” to indicate this universality with respect to the coalition
size: coalitions of any size can be caught efficiently with this
scheme. Note that in the (dynamic) Tardos scheme, we used
the distribution function Fδ where δ = δ (c0) = O(c−4/30 ) de-
pends on c0. Instead, we will use a distribution function F that
can be used for all values of c, so that we can use the same
codewords to catch coalitions of any size. In particular, we
will use the first ℓ(c) = O(c2 ln(n/ε1)) symbols to catch coali-
tions of size c, for each c between 2 and c0. We do this in
such a way that if a coalition has some unknown size c, then
after ℓ(c) = O(c2 ln(n/ε1) symbols, the probability of not hav-
ing caught all members of this coalition is at most ε2. Since we
do this for each value of c, we now only need O(c2 ln(n/ε1))
symbols to catch a coalition of a priori unknown size c, com-
pared to the O(c20 ln(n/ε1)) worst-case codelength of the static
and dynamic Tardos schemes, and the O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)) practical
codelength of the dynamic Tardos scheme.
The only drawback of this new codeword generation method
is that a completely universal distribution function, which is
completely efficient for all values of c, does not seem to exist.
More precisely, the proof of soundness of the Tardos scheme
requires the cutoff parameter δ to be sufficiently large in terms
of c, whereas for completeness we need that δ approaches 0
as c → ∞. Our solution to this problem is the following. For
generating the values of pi, we use the standard arcsine distri-
bution function F from Eq. (1), with no cutoffs. Then, for each
value of c, we simply disregard those values pi that are not be-
tween the corresponding cutoff δ (c) and 1− δ (c). The fraction
of values of pi that is disregarded can be estimated as follows:
1−
∫ 1−δ (c)
δ (c)
f (p)dp = 4
pi
arcsin
√
δ (c) = 4c
−2/3
pi
√
dδ
+O(c−2).
So the fraction of disregarded positions is very small and de-
creases when c increases.
5.1 Construction
The construction now basically consists of running several dy-
namic Tardos schemes simultaneously with shared codewords.
So scheme parameters and scores now have to be calculated for
each of these schemes, i.e., for each of the values of c. We intro-
duce counters t(c) to keep track of the number of positions that
have not been disregarded. For each c, we then run a dynamic
Tardos scheme using the same code X until t(c) = ℓ(c).
1. Initialization phase
For each c ∈ {2, . . . ,c0 = n}:
(a) Take the codelength as ℓ(c) = d(c)ℓ c2 ln(n/ε
(c)
1 ).
(b) Take the threshold as Z(c) = d(c)z c ln(n/ε(c)1 ).
(c) Take the cutoff parameter as δ (c) = 1/(d(c)δ c4/3).
(d) Initialize the user scores at S(c)j (0) = 0.
(e) Initialize the counters t(c) at t(c)(0) = 0.
2. Codeword generation
For each position i ≥ 1:
(a) Select pi ∈ [0,1] from F(p) as defined in (1).
(b) Generate X j,i ∈ {0,1} using P(X j,i = 1) = pi.
3. Distribution/Detection/Accusation
For each position i≥ 1:
(a) Send to each active user j symbol X j,i.
(b) Detect the pirate output yi.
(If there is no pirate output, terminate.)
(c) Calculate scores S j,i using (4).
(d) For active users j and values c such that pi ∈
[δ (c),1− δ (c)], set S(c)j (i) = S(c)j (i− 1)+ S j,i.
(Otherwise set S(c)j (i) = S(c)j (i− 1).)
(e) For values of c such that pi ∈ [δ (c),1− δ (c)], set
t(c)(i) = t(c)(i− 1)+ 1.
(Otherwise set t(c)(i) = t(c)(i− 1).)
(f) Disconnect all active users j with S(c)j (i) > Z(c) and
t(c)(i)≤ ℓ(c) for some c.
As was already mentioned in Section 3.1, if desired
the codeword generation can be merged with the distribu-
tion/detection/accusation phase. This depends on the scenario
and the exact implementation of the scheme.
Also note that several variations can be made to the above
construction, to deal with specific situations. One could easily
replace c0 = n by a smaller value of c0 to restrict the amount of
memory needed, if a sharper upper bound on c is known. And
of course, we may also choose to draw values pi from Fδ (c0) , as
values pi ∈ [0,1]\ [δ (c0),1− δ (c0)] are disregarded for all c.
A less obvious optimization would be to use a geometric pro-
gression of values c, e.g., c ∈ {2,4,8,16, . . . ,c0} and maintain
the user scores only for this set of coalition sizes, rather than
for all values of c ∈ {2, . . . ,c0}. This significantly reduces the
space requirement per user from O(c0) to O(logc0). However,
if the actual coalition size is, say, 33, then the coalition may not
be caught until we reach c = 64. Since the codelength scales
quadratically in c, this means that the codelength increases by
a worst-case factor of 4. In general, using any geometric pro-
gression with geometric factor r possibly loses a factor r2 in
the codelengths. We have chosen to give the construction with
many scores per user, to show that we then still obtain the same
asymptotic codelengths. But the above construction is just one
of the many alternatives to catch coalitions of any size effi-
ciently.
5.2 Soundness
For the universal Tardos scheme we get the following result re-
garding soundness.
Theorem 3. Consider the universal Tardos scheme in Sec-
tion 5.1. If (S’) is satisfied for each set of parameters
d(c)z ,d(c)ℓ ,d
(c)
δ ,ε
(c)
1 , and if the ε(c)1 satisfy the following require-
ment:
c0∑
c=2
ε
(c)
1 ≤ ε1, (E)
then the scheme is ε1-sound.
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Proof. For each c ∈ {2, . . . ,c0}, let ˆC(c) be the set of users
that are accused because their scores S(c)j exceeded Z(c) before
t(c) > ℓ(c). Then ˆC =
⋃c0
c=2
ˆC(c). For any c, we can apply The-
orem 1 to the parameters d(c)ℓ ,d
(c)
z ,d(c)δ ,a
(c) and ε(c)1 so that we
know that the probability that j ∈ ˆC(c) for innocent users j is at
most ε(c)1 /n. So the overall probability that an innocent user is
disconnected is bounded from above by
P( j ∈ ˆC)≤
c0∑
c=2
P( j ∈ ˆC(c))≤
c0∑
c=2
ε
(c)
1
n
≤ ε1
n
.
This completes the proof.
Note that one can choose values ε(c)1 satisfying (E) such
that O(c2 ln(n/ε(c)1 )) = O(c2 ln(n/ε1)), e.g., by taking ε
(c)
1 =
6ε1/(pi2c2). If furthermore c = no(1) is subpolynomial in n,
then asymptotically dℓc2 ln(n/ε
(c)
1 ) = dℓc2 ln(n/ε1)(1 + o(1))
and we achieve the same asymptotic codelength as in the static
and dynamic Tardos schemes.
5.3 Dynamic completeness
The main advantage of the universal Tardos scheme is that we
can now prove dynamic completeness for all values of c.
Theorem 4. Consider the universal Tardos scheme in Sec-
tion 5.1. If (C’) is satisfied for each set of parameters
d(c)z ,d(c)ℓ ,d
(c)
δ ,ε
(c)
1 ,η(c), where η(c) = ln(1/ε2)/ ln(n/ε
(c)
1 ), then
for each c∈ {2, . . . ,c0} the scheme is dynamic (ε2,c)-complete.
Proof. This follows directly from applying Theorem 2 to
d(c)ℓ ,d
(c)
z ,d(c)δ ,a
(c) and ε(c)1 , where c is the actual (unknown)
coalition size.
To prove that the scheme catches a coalition of size c, we
only argued that the coalition’s score S(c)(i) will exceed cZ(c)
before we have seen ℓ(c) positions i with pi ∈ [δ (c),1−δ (c)]. In
reality, the probability of catching the coalition is much larger
than this, since for instance with high probability the coalition
score S(c−1) will also exceed Z(c−1) before we have seen ℓ(c−1)
positions with pi ∈ [δ (c−1),1−δ (c−1)]. And if a pirate is discon-
nected because for some k his score S(k)j exceeded the threshold
Z(k), then we do not have to wait until S(i)> c ˜Z(c) but only until
S(i)> (c−1)Z(c)+Z(k). And since S(i) has a constant slope, as
soon as a pirate is caught, the other pirates’ scores will increase
even faster. In practice we therefore also see that we usually
need fewer than ℓ(c) positions to catch c colluders.
5.4 Codelengths
The theoretical results from the previous subsections are not
for exactly ℓ(c) watermark positions, but for some number of
symbols T (c) such that there are ℓ(c) positions i between 1 and
T (c) with pi ∈ [δ (c),1− δ (c)]. The difference T (c)− ℓ(c) is a
random variable, and is distributed according to a negative bi-
nomial distribution with parameters r = ℓ(c) (the number of suc-
cesses we are waiting for) and p = 1−P(pi ∈ [δ (c),1−δ (c)]) =
4
pi arcsin(
√
δ (c)) (the probability of a success). Because the
parameter p = O(c−2/3) is very small for large c, the differ-
ence between T (c) and ℓ(c) will also be small. More precisely,
T (c) has mean ℓ(c)/(1− p) = ℓ(c)(1+O(c−2/3)) and variance
σ2 = ℓ(c)p/(1− p)2 = O(ℓ(c)c−2/3), and the probability that
T (c) exceeds its mean by m > 0 decreases exponentially in m.
Also note that if some upper bound c0 ≥ c is used for con-
structing the scheme as described earlier, and if the values of pi
are drawn from Fδ (c0) instead of F , then we have T
(c0) = ℓ(c0),
as no values of pi are disregarded for c = c0. So then the maxi-
mum codelength is fixed in advance, at the cost of possibly not
catching coalitions of size c > c0.
Finally, note that this scheme is constructed in such a way
that coalitions of any (small) size can be caught more efficiently.
To catch a coalition of size c we now only use O(c2 ln(n/ε1))
symbols. This in comparison to the static and dynamic Tar-
dos scheme, where we need O(c20 ln(n/ε1)) and O(cc0 ln(n/ε1))
symbols respectively, where c0 is again some upper bound on
the coalition size used to construct the schemes. So while us-
ing the dynamic Tardos scheme already reduces the codelength
by a factor c
c0
, the universal Tardos scheme shaves off another
factor c
c0
.
5.5 Example
As before, let the scheme parameters be given by n = 106
and ε1 = ε2 = 10−3. Let us use ε(c)1 = 6ε1/(pi2c2), so that
∑c0=nc=2 ε(c)1 ≤ ε1. Let us assume the coalition again has an actual
size of c = 25. The optimal values of d(25)ℓ ,d
(25)
z ,d(25)δ satisfy-
ing (S’) and (C’) can be calculated numerically as
d(25)ℓ = 8.59, d
(25)
z = 4.61, d(25)δ = 13.83.
This leads to the corresponding scheme parameters
ℓ(25) = 148457, Z(25) = 3188, δ (25) = 9.89 ·10−4.
In Fig. 5 we show some simulation results for these parameters,
where we only show the thresholds Z(2), . . . ,Z(25). In Fig. 5a we
simulated pirates using the interleaving attack, and in Fig. 5b
the pirates used the scapegoat strategy. As one can see, in the
universal Tardos scheme the scapegoat strategy is not a good
strategy, as the whole coalition is caught very soon. This is be-
cause the scapegoat strategy basically divides the coalition in 25
coalitions of size 1, and as mentioned before, small coalitions
are caught much sooner in the universal Tardos scheme.
6 Discussion
Comparing the universal Tardos scheme to the static Tardos
scheme, we see that the main advantages are that (a) we now
have certainty about catching the whole coalition (instead of at
least one pirate), and (b) we no longer need the coalition size,
or a sharp upper bound on the coalition size, as input. We do
need to calculate multiple scores per user, namely one for each
possible coalition size c. But since the only disadvantage of a
large c0 is this larger number of scores per user and thus a larger
offline space requirement (which may not be a big issue), c0 can
easily be much higher than the expected coalition size c. This
in contrast to the static and dynamic Tardos schemes, where an
increase in c0 means an increase in the theoretical and practical
codelengths as well.
In Table 1 we list some of the differences between the static,
dynamic, weakly dynamic and universal Tardos schemes. Here
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Figure 5: Simulations of the universal Tardos scheme, with parameters c, c0,
n, ε1 , and ε2 as in Figs. 1 and 3. The black bars show the thresholds Z(c), for
c = 2, . . . ,25. For each pirate j we only show the score S(c)j (i) that made him
get caught. In reality, all users have 25 slightly different scores.
we assume that the upper bound c0 on the number of colluders is
the same for each scheme. The actual coalition size is denoted
by c. The example referred to in the table is the example used
throughout this paper, with c = c0 = 25, n = 106, and ε1 = ε2 =
10−3. The practical codelengths are based on 1000 simulations
for each scheme, where the pirates used the interleaving attack
in all cases. For the weakly dynamic Tardos scheme we used
B = 8 in our example.
Since our schemes are dynamic traitor tracing schemes, it
makes sense to also compare them to other dynamic schemes
from the literature. Recall from Section 1.2 that the scheme of
Fiat and Tassa [4], the schemes of Berkman et al. [1] and the
scheme of Roelse [8] are deterministic schemes. That is, each
of these schemes always catches all pirates and no user is ever
falsely accused, which are advantages compared to probabilistic
schemes such as our schemes. An additional advantage of these
schemes is that they have very short codelengths. On the other
hand, it was shown by Fiat and Tassa [4] that q ≥ c + 1 for
any deterministic scheme, so these schemes cannot be used in
scenarios in which a small alphabet size is required.
As is the case with our schemes, the dynamic scheme of
Tassa [11] is probabilistic and uses a binary alphabet (i.e.,
q = 2). The codelengths of these schemes can therefore be
compared directly. In particular, the codelength of the scheme
of Tassa is Θ(c4 log2(n) ln(n/ε1)), which is more than a fac-
tor Θ(c2) larger than the codelengths of our schemes. In fact,
to the best of our knowledge our schemes have the shortest
order codelengths of all known binary dynamic traitor tracing
schemes.
Below we list some other nice properties of the universal Tar-
dos scheme, which are not related to the codelength or the al-
phabet size. Most of these properties are inherited from the
static Tardos scheme.
Codewords of users are independent. This means that fram-
ing a specific innocent user is basically impossible, as the code-
words of the pirates and the pirate output are independent of
the innocent users’ codewords. Also, a new user can be added
to the system easily after the codewords of other users have al-
ready been generated, since the codewords of other users do not
have to be updated.
Codeword positions are independent. In other words, the
scheme does not need the information obtained from the previ-
ous pirate output to generate new symbols for each user. There-
fore the codewords can even be generated in advance. This also
allows us to effectively tackle weakly dynamic traitor tracing
scenarios, as described in Section 4. In particular, the total trac-
ing times of the dynamic schemes presented in [1, 4, 8, 11] are
bounded from below by the total delay, defined as the code-
length of the scheme times the delay of the pirates’ transmis-
sion. By comparison, the total tracing times of our weakly dy-
namic schemes only increase marginally if B increases. As a
result, for a large delay (i.e. for a large value of B), our weakly
dynamic schemes have the shortest total tracing times of all
known dynamic schemes.
The distribution of watermark symbols is identical for each
position. This property offers new options, like tracing sev-
eral coalitions simultaneously, using the same traitor tracing
code. This also means that multiple watermarks from several
broadcasts can be concatenated and viewed as one long water-
mark from one longer broadcast, allowing one to catch large
coalitions with multiple watermarked broadcasts.
The codeword generation and accusation algorithm are
computationally and memory-wise efficient. The schemes
do not require any complicated data structures and computa-
tions, and the only memory needed during the broadcast is the
scores for each user at that time, and the counters t(c). During
the broadcast only simple calculations are needed: computing
S j,i (which has to be calculated only once), adding S j,i to those
scores S(c)j where c satisfies a certain condition, and comparing
the scores S(c)j to the thresholds Z(c).
Several instances of the scheme can be run simultaneously.
For example, by using parameters {ε(c)1 } with ∑ε(c)1 ≤ 0.01 and
{ ¯ε(c)1 } with ∑ ¯ε(c)1 ≤ 0.05 for two different instances of the uni-
versal Tardos scheme (using the same codewords), a pirate will
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Table 1: A comparison of the Tardos schemes discussed in this paper.
static dynamic weakly dynamic weakly dynamic universal
(Section 2) (Section 3) (Section 4.1) (Section 4.2) (Section 5)
scores per user 1 1 1 1 c0− 1
density function f (c0) f (c0) f (c0) f (c0) f
blocks 1 of size ℓ ℓ of size 1 ℓ/B of size B ℓ/B of size B ℓ of size 1
guilty caught at least 1 all c all c all c all c
expected codelength O(c20 ln(n/ε1)) O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)) O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)) O(cc0 ln(n/ε1)) O(c2 ln(n/ε1))
asymptotic codelength pi22 c
2 ln(n/ε1) pi
2
2 c
2 ln(n/ε1) pi
2
2 c
2 ln(n/ε1) pi
2
2 c
2 ln(n/ε1) pi
2
2 c
2 ln(n/ε1)
example, theoretical codelength 109585 116561 116761 131587 148457
example, practical codelength 109585 92000 92000 96000 89000
first cross one of the thresholds associated to { ¯ε1}, and only
later cross one of the thresholds associated to the {ε1}. If we
use the {ε1} for disconnecting users, then even before a user is
disconnected, we can give some sort of statistic to indicate the
‘suspiciousness’ of this user. If a user then does not cross the
highest thresholds, one could still decide whether to disconnect
him or not. After all, the choice of ε1 may be arbitrary, and a
user that almost crosses the thresholds Z(c) is likely to be guilty
as well.
7 Open problems
Let us conclude with mentioning some open problems for future
research.
7.1 A single-score universal Tardos scheme
Although we argued that the universal Tardos scheme has sev-
eral advantages over other binary schemes, it has a minor draw-
back: we have to keep multiple scores for each user, namely for
each possible coalition size c. To address this issue, one could
try making small adjustments to the universal Tardos scheme,
or start from the dynamic Tardos scheme and build a different,
c0-independent traitor tracing scheme. For instance, would it be
possible to change the process of generating the pi’s such that
no positions are ever disregarded? Then all scores for one user
would be the same, and we would only have to keep one score
for each user.
7.2 A continuous universal Tardos scheme
Looking at Fig. 5 suggests that a continuous threshold function
Z(i) might also be an option, with Z depending on the position
i instead of on the coalition size c. However, for the proof of
soundness of the universal Tardos scheme, we simply added up
the error probabilities for each threshold and showed that this
sum is still less than ε1. If we use a continuous function Z(i) and
use this same proof method, this would lead to even smaller val-
ues of ε(i) and longer codelengths. Still, theoretically it would
be interesting to see if such a continuous threshold function can
be constructed.
7.3 A fully dynamic Tardos scheme
Most dynamic schemes find their strength in being able to ad-
just the next codeword symbols to the previous pirate output. In
the dynamic Tardos scheme, we do not use this ability at all, and
only use the dynamic setting to disconnect users inbetween. It
is an open problem whether better results can be obtained with
a fully dynamic Tardos scheme, that does use this extra power
given to the distributor.
7.4 A weakly dynamic deterministic scheme
The deterministic dynamic schemes in [1, 4, 8, 11] are not de-
signed for the weakly dynamic setting, and it is not obvious how
to adapt these schemes to this setting. The design and analysis
of efficient weakly dynamic deterministic schemes is therefore
an open problem.
7.5 The dynamic traitor tracing capacity
On the other hand, it is also very well possible that no fully
dynamic Tardos scheme exists that achieves significantly better
codelengths. For the static setting, it is known that the order
codelength of the Tardos scheme (quadratic in c0, logarithmic
in n) is optimal. But what about the dynamic setting? What
is the optimal order codelength required to catch all colluders?
Our results show that the optimal order codelength is at most
quadratic in c, but this may not be optimal.
7.6 A q-ary dynamic Tardos scheme
In this paper we discussed several probabilistic dynamic
schemes, taking the static binary Tardos scheme and the re-
sults of Laarhoven and De Weger [6] as starting points. The de-
sign and analysis of q-ary probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing
schemes is still an open problem. A possible approach for solv-
ing this problem is to take the q-ary Tardos scheme of ˇSkoric´ et
al. [9] as a starting point.
In a recent paper, Laarhoven et al. [7] presented another ap-
proach to solve this problem. It was shown that with a divide-
and-conquer construction, any binary dynamic traitor tracing
scheme can be turned into a q-ary dynamic traitor tracing
scheme with a codelength that is roughly a factor q/2 smaller
than the codelength of the underlying binary scheme. Apply-
ing this to the constructions described in this paper, this leads
to q-ary dynamic Tardos schemes with codelengths of the order
ℓq = O
(
c2
q ln
n
ε1
)
. Moreover, for fixed q and large c, this leads
to an asymptotic codelength of ℓq → pi2q c2 ln nε1 , compared to the
ℓ2 → pi22 c2 ln nε1 of the binary schemes presented in this paper.
For details, see [7].
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